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ABSTRACT

Excavation cave-ins in the construction industry have historically injured and
killed workers throughout the nation.

In 1990 the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) excavation standards were completely revised in response to
years of controversy over the ambiguities in the earlier standards.
The primary purpose for this study was to evaluate the historical data for
excavation cave-in accidents over the period from 1985 through 1994 and determine if
there is evidence that the 1990 revisions to the regulations have had a positive impact on
1.

reducing accidents. OSHA data from the Integrated Management Information System
(IMIS) were utilized to obtain 540 reports on excavation cave-ins for a ten-year period
from 1985 through 1994. These data were evaluated against various criteria to identify
factors that influenced any trends in the data. A review of various other resources on
cave-in accidents, training, and inspections were consulted to obtain a broader
perspective on the causes and prevention of cave-ins.
Most cave-in accidents continued to occur in small companies, usually in
relatively shallow trenches while installing pipelines. The primary cause of cave-in
accidents continued to be the lack of employing any type of protective system. The
incident rate of excavation cave-ins decreased over the ten-year period. The five-year
period since the revisions to the regulations in 1990 showed a notable decrease in
accident rates compared to the previous five years. Penalties for citations during the
latter five years were significantly higher than for the prior five years.
111
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Once or twice each year we hear of another accident in the community in
which an excavation cave-in injures or kills one or more construction workers, such
as a recent one in the author's community

~

few days ago that trapped and injured

two workers in a pipeline trench (Garland 3). These excavations are often trenches
being excavated for water or sewer lines or electrical utilities.

The reaction of

survivors and witnesses usually sounds familiar: "We had done this plenty of times
in the past" or "It was a freak accident" (Towns 12). Cave-ins are actually too
common, and predictable, to be described as freak accidents. The costs of lost job
time, investigations, and litigation are significant, but the really tragic loss is the
emotional, and often financial, suffering experienced by family members, friends,
and fellow workers of the victim. Excavation accidents are not unique to recent
times; they have been occurring for centuries. However, the increase in excavation
work in this century from expanding industry and use of efficient powered
equipment has resulted in more workers being exposed to excavation hazards.
Increased knowledge of soils mechanics, testing, and analyses have led to
better understanding of how excavation walls fail and improved methods of
protecting workers. Proven systems have been developed to prevent cave-ins. The
equipment needed to protect workers from trench cave-ins is readily available.
Sloping the walls of excavations, restraining them with wood or metal shoring, or
use of shields, commonly called "trench boxes" are available and could essentially
eliminate cave-in accidents if properly implemented.
Training is another primary defense against excavation cave-in accidents and
is relatively new in that it has only been emphasized within the last few years.
1

Training courses typically strive to educate workers and supervisors to recognize
trench hazards and understand how to monitor and control them.
There was a time when there were no regulations for controlling excavation
safety. Prior to the existence of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), some states enacted legislation for construction safety, including
excavation work. With the passage of the OSHA Act of 1970, new regulations were
promulgated and renewed attention was directed at the enforcement of all areas of
industrial and construction safety, including excavations. The original excavation
regulations were promulgated in 1971. They became controversial as they were
difficult to understand and were subject to varying interpretations. This resulted in a
completely revised excavation regulation that became effective in 1990.
Knowledge, training, protective methods and equipment, laws, and penalties
exist to protect excavation workers. Still, in all areas of the country, excavations
continue to cave-in and workers continue to be injured or killed by them. This raises
the question of how effective the regulations have been in reducing cave-ins.
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the regulations affecting
excavation safety, review training methods and protective systems for the prevention
of cave-ins, and evaluate the impacts of the 1990 revisions to the OSHA excavation
regulations. Accident investigation data and other sources were studied to detect any
trends related to occurrences of cave-ins, and identify significant factors that
influenced cave-in accident rates. Particular emphasis was given to the review of
OSHA excavation accident reports for cave-ins for the ten-year period from 1985
through 1994. The data for the five-year periods immediately before and after the
1990 revisions to the regulations were evaluated to determine if the 1990 revisions
were effective in reducing the incident rate of excavation cave-ins.

2

CHAPTER2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The primary source of information utilized in this study was the OSHA IMIS
data base from 1985 through 1994, but other literature concerning excavation caveins was also researched.

Several OSHA publications were reviewed to obtain

information related to excavation regulations, safety, and training.
An OSHA report by Culver, et al (2), that analyzed OSHA data for
construction fatalities from 1985 through 1989 contained valuable statistical
information on cave-in accidents. An

Em~ineerini News Record article by W. Krizan

and H. Bradford (6) provided information on union vs. nonunion fatality rates.
Trench safety and training programs were reviewed including Georgia Tech
Research Institute (4), M. F. Hein at Auburn University (5), J. L. Mickle at Iowa State
University (7), and the Department of Energy's Pacific Northwest Laboratory (15).
These provided insight into the structure, methods, and quality of available training.
A report by Thompson and Tanenbaum ( 11 ), that surveyed accident data on
cave-ins in the mid-1970s, was found in the September 1977 issue of the ASCE

Proceedin2s, Journal of the Construction Division.

This report provided excellent

information on the causes and frequency rates of cave-in accidents in that time period
that was useful for comparative purposes. Another similar report by Suruda, et al (9),
provided analysis of cave-in accidents from 1974 to 1986 that was also very
beneficial for comparison to the data evaluated in this study.

3

CHAPTER3
EXCAVATION REGULATIONS

Prior to OSHA
Excavation accidents no doubt have been occurring for centuries as past
civilizations manually excavated for building foundations, canals, and raw materials.
Photographs of construction work in the late l 800's and early l 900's document the
absence of basic safety equipment and procedures in excavation work of that period.
Such practices surely resulted in numerous accidents and fatalities, but about the only
information one can obtain must be gleaned from newspaper articles of the time.
Concerns about excavation accidents received official government attention at
least as far back as the early I 900's. Anthony Surud~ et al, (9) identified a study that
was commissioned by Prime Minister Winston Churchill resulting in the Report

the Committee on Deep

of

Excavations in London in 1912. The committee's report

recommended shoring excavation walls with timber, providing egress ladders, and
evaluation of soil stability, all elements in current OSHA regulations.
Prior to OSHA, some state governments enacted laws to require safer
excavation methods. An example is the Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 53, Chapter
3 9, that created a Construction Safety Board within the State Department of Labor in
1965 (10). Part 9, Excavations and Shoring, contained elements similar to current
OSHA standards. Any excavation over five feet in depth required cave-in protection
measures of shoring, shields, or sloping to the angle of repose unless the work was
being perfonned in solid rock. There were precautions about impacts of vibrations
from vehicles and the increased risks of excavating in backfilled soils. Ladders were
required at least every fifty feet of lateral travel.
4

However, design criteria were

somewhat vague, and there were no requirements for design calculations or approvals
by a professional engineer.

OSHA Regulations Prior to 1990
The OSHA excavation regulations, 29 CFR 1926, Subpart P - Excavation,
Trenching and Shoring ( 14), were first issued in 1971 to define and enforce national
safety standards for excavation work. The regulation included four sections. Section
1926.650 provided general protection requirements. Among other requirements, it
called for daily inspections of excavations by a "competent person" and work in the
excavation was to cease if there was any evidence of potential cave-ins or slides.
However, there was no definition or training mandated to qualify one as a competent
person, and it was unclear who was to stop the work if dangerous conditions were
observed.
Section 1926.651 provided specific excavation requirements, 1926.652
covered specific trenching requirements, and 1926.653 gave definitions of terms.
Excavations were defined as "any manmade cavity or depression in the earth's surface
... producing unsupported earth conditions by reasons of the excavation."

Trenches

were defined as "a narrow excavation made below the surface of the ground" and "in
general, the depth is greater than the width." These definitions generated arguments
due to varying interpretations among contractors and OSHA inspectors. An article by
Robert Polumbo (8) in Occupational

Health and Safety explained, "Since all trenches

are excavations, OSHA held that both sets of specific requirements were enforceable
during trenching operations. However, if an excavation was not a trench, the agency
held that only the excavation requirements applied. Some contractors had a different

5

opinion. They argued that the trenching requirements applied to trenches and the
excavation requirements applied to all other excavations. 11
Both sections on excavation and trenches contained ambiguous requirements.
Excavations were required to be guarded by some protective method if workers would
be exposed "to danger from moving ground." How to evaluate the potential for the
danger of moving ground was unclear.

If plans at a work site were for the excavation walls to be sloped or shored to
provide protection, then listed factors that must be considered were depth of cut,
weather conditions, vibration from nearby equipment or traffic, stored materials,
blasting, and various other factors. Assuming one considered all the factors, then the
only guidance for sloping the excavation was a figure that indicated using a forty-five
degree slope for "average soils." No definition or guidance was given for determining
if one was working in an "average soil."
A note with the figure directed that "clays, silts, loams, or non-homogenous
soils require shoring and bracing." The guidance for shoring was a trench shoring
table showing increasing sizes of timbers at closer spacing with increasing trench
depths and worsening soil conditions. Soil classifications were described "hard" and
"likely to crack" which were subject to different judgments by construction personnel
and inspectors.

A footnote to the table provided for the alternative of using trench

jacks "in lieu of, or in combination with, cross braces." Another footnote stated,
"Where desirable, steel sheet piling and bracing of equal strength may be substituted
for wood."

In attempting to ensure the integrity of shoring systems, the regulations

required that they be designed "by a qualified person and meet accepted engineering
requirements. 11

"Accepted engineering requirements" were defined as standards

required by registered architects or engineers or "other duly licensed or recognized
6

authority." Some contractors argued that due to their years of experience, they were
recognized authorities and could design a shoring system. Excavations greater than
twenty feet in depth were required to have support systems designed by a "qualified
person," but again, without offering a definition or means of determining if a person
was qualified.
The note with the figure on sloping further stated that "the presence of ground
water requires special treatment."

The special treatment for ground water and other

conditions such as loose boulders, slide planes, etc., was to flatten the angle of repose.
No guidance was provided to determine how much to flatten. Other vague terms
describing soil types such as "unstable," "soft," and "hard or compact" were used, but
without any guidance on how to determine which soil category was the correct
characterization for a given excavation.
All of these ambiguities and differing interpretations of the regulations created
controversies and were frustrating to both contractors and OSHA personnel.
Eventually OSHA commissioned a study by the National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) to evaluate the regulations. The NIST study was conducted from
1976 through 1980, and with input from other studies and data, resulted in revised
Subpart P regulations (13) that became effective in 1990.

Originally, they were to

become effective on January 2, 1990, but were later extended to March 5, 1990, to
give contractors more time to educate their employees about the new standards.

OSHA Revisions of 1990
The 1990 revisions updated the entire regulation for excavation, and in the
words of one of OSHA's Public Affairs Specialists, Deborah Crawford ( 1), the
revisions were to "simplify many of the existing provisions, add and clarify
7
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definitions, eliminate duplicate provisions and ambiguous language, and give
employers added flexibility in providing protection for employees." According to
Ms. Crawford, OSHA estimated that the revised standards would prevent up to
seventy-five fatalities and 3,000 injuries annually.
The revised standards redefined various terms to add clarity, rearranged the
structure of the standards, and added new appendices to provide directions for soil
classification, sloping, and benching requirements. Pictorial examples of shoring and
shielding methods were provided along with tabulated data to assist in selecting
shoring timbers and hydraulic shoring.
The disagreements over the original regulations as to whether earth removal at
a given job was an excavation or a trench were addressed by not having separate
sections for excavations and trenches.

The standard now addressed only open

excavations, with excavations being defined to include trenches.
"Competent person" was now defined as "one who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings, or working conditions which are
unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees."

As in the previous standard,

there were no specific training requirements for the competent person, but the
definition has been interpreted to imply that training in addition to on-the-job
experience is necessary to meet the intent of the definition.

This remained a

debatable issue, but at least some guidance was now provided in selecting the
competent person. The

OSHA Technical Manual

(20) provides some insight into

OSHA's intent as it states that the competent person should have "training,
experience, and knowledge of soil analysis, use of protective systems, and
requirements of 29 CFR Part 1926, Subpart P."

8

To resolve the previous uncertainty about who was responsible for responding
to hazardous situations, the competent person was further defined as one "who has
authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate" hazardous conditions.
The competent person was still required to make daily inspections, but now the daily
inspection requirements were more specific. Inspections were now required prior to
the start of work, at any other time the competent person deemed necessary, and they
were mandatory after every rainstorm.
The previous ambiguity in soil classification was addressed in the revised
standard by the inclusion of Appendix A which classified soils into three types. Soil
types were designated as type A, B, or C, in descending order of stability. There were
specific characteristics defining each type to assist the competent person in
classifying the soil. The revised standard required "at least one visual and at least one
manual analysis."
Visual observations of the excavation walls, the excavated material, and the
surface adjacent to the excavation were required.

Suspicious conditions were

identified as moisture content, general soil grain size, tension cracks, layered soils,
seeping water, and vibrations from adjacent traffic or construction equipment.
Several simple manual tests that could easily be performed in the field were
provided. Plasticity could be evaluated by rolling a thread of soil about one-eight
inch diameter by two inches long between one's hands and suspending from one end.
Dry strength could be evaluated by observing how easily the soil crumbled under
pressure. Compressive strength of soil could be evaluated by the "thumb penetration
test" adopted from the American Society for Testing and Materials. This test is self
descriptive in that one observes how easily the thumb can penetrate the soil and
correlates that to ranges of compressive strength. Pocket penetrometers or hand9

operated shear-vane instruments were also identified as acceptable methods of
making compressive strength evaluations in the field.

To assist in classifying

cohesive, fissured, or granular material, a practical drying test was described using a
one-inch thick by six-inch diameter sample of soil. Instructions were provided on
how to characterize the sample, after drying, based on observations for evidence of
cracking, and then hand breaking of the sample to gauge its strength.
Obviously, all of these manual tests were subject to interpretation of the
person performing the tests. However, considering the absence of any guidance for
soil classification in the previous standard, the ease and practicality of these simple
field tests in the revised st~dard represented a significant improvement.
As in earlier versions, the revised standard required that any excavation five
feet or more in depth, unless it was entirely in stable rock, had to have a protective
system before it could be entered by workers.
sloping, shoring, or shields.
professional engineer.

The protective system could be

Alternatively, a system could be designed by a

Unique, job specific designed systems by professional

engineers appear to be rare, probably because the range of viable designs is already
covered in the regulations.

Also, the concern with liability is a deterrent to an

engineer designing a unique system rather than deferring to the standard OSHA
systems. There are some specialty systems such as ground freezing systems that
freeze a wall around the excavation area. Such systems are very expensive, and are
designed more for protection of structures than personnel, and are not practical or cost
effective for the majority of excavations.
Guidance for sloping or benching ("stair stepping") the face of excavations
was included in Appendix B. Pictorial examples were provided to show correct
methods to slope or bench excavations in each of the three soil types,. including
10

layered soils, for varying excavation depths. This provided a "menu" of sketches
from which a given excavation could be compared and thus made it much easier to
select a safe configuration that could be implemented in the field.
Appendix C was added to provide guidance in building timber shoring.
Tabled data were provided that clearly indicated the sizes of all members of shoring
systems that should be employed in for each of the three types of soil. Similarly,
Appendix D offered an easily understandable method of selecting proper aluminum
shoring from a series of sketches and tabled information.
Appendix E provided other approved methods of shoring such as vertical rail
shoring with hydraulic, pneumatic, or screw type jacks. Trench shields, commonly
called trench boxes, were another available option if they were designed by a
professional engineer.
Finally, Appendix F provided simple flow charts to guide one through the
entire process of evaluation of the physical conditions of an excavation to the final
selection of the proper method of shoring, sloping, or shielding.

State OSHA Programs
OSHA offers encouragement and financial assistance to states for the
operation of their own health and safety programs. OSHA will finance up to one-half
of a state's budget to operate an approved plan. To be approved, OSHA requires that
the state plan must be "at least as effective as" the federal program and provide site
inspections, training, and education programs (21 ).

Currently, twenty-three states

operate complete state plans, meaning they have jurisdiction over private, and state

11

and local government employees. Two other states have partial programs covering
public employees only.

After a state has sufficiently proved its ability to

independently enforce standards, OSHA will grant "final approval" at which time it
relinquishes its authority over the state's program. Among the twenty-five states or
territories with their own programs, fourteen have obtained final approval including
Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virgin Islands, Virginia, and Wyoming.
State programs can impose standards beyond those required by the federal
program.

For example, California requires contractors to obtain a permit before

starting any excavation that will exceed five feet in depth. Most states also require
contractors to be licensed to assist in monitoring the industry.

12

CHAPTER4
EXCAVATION TRAINING

Notable in the regulations, both before and after the I 990 revisions, was the
absence of any explicit training requirements for competent persons, workers, or
supervisors. However, in OSHA' s publication Trainini Requirements in

OSHA

Standards and Trainini Guidelines (22), certain standards are listed as ones that
require training.

Among those listed as having required training for competent

persons are the design of structural ramps used for access or egress from excavations,
protection of hazards associated with water accumulation, and the daily inspections.
There are no training requirements mentioned for workers or supervisors. Even in the
absence of explicitly required training, companies and government entities recognized
the need for training and created a market for training on how to avoid cave-ins and in
understanding the OSHA standards.
Materials for training courses from private providers, government contractors,
Auburn University's Building Science Department, the Georgia Tech Research
Institute, and the training materials in the OSHA Technical Manual were reviewed to
obtain an overview of the methods and quality of typical training courses. A variety of
formats are available, including conventional seminar texts for instructor-led courses,
videos, and self-taught courses via the internet.
All of the courses impressed upon the student how quickly a cave-in can occur.
They nearly always occur without warning.
outrunning them.

There is very little probability of

Numerous victims have died from asphyxiation from being

completely engulfed by cave-ins. Others have died or lost limbs from the crushing
pressure of being buried in soil covering only part of their bodies. All of the training
13

courses noted that soil weighs approximately one hundred pounds per cubic foot and
thus it takes only a few cubic feet of it from a cave-in to trap and immobilize a worker.
The tragic statistics and some news coverage of actual accidents were usually
presented to further gain the student's attention. Convincing the average worker of the
seriousness of cave-in risks appeared to be the most important element in effective
training. If all excavation workers understood how quickly a cave-in could kill, and
how often they have, certainly they would have more incentive for learning how to
recognize and avoid excavation hazards.
Each of the courses also covered the mechanics of how a cave-in occurs, a
review of the OSHA standards, training on how to detect dangerous conditions, and
the types of acceptable sloping, shoring, and shields available to protect workers. All
of the courses appeared to be very adequate in providing all of the pertinent
information necessary for a worker to become aware of excavation dangers and the
methods available to avoid injury or death from a cave-in.
A detriment to widespread training being obtained throughout the industry may
be the direct cost for the training and cost of time away from the job. Fees for training
sessions typically cost from $100 to $200 per student for courses led by an instructor,
and about $500 for a video taped course that can be presented to groups. Eight hours
of training was typical for most courses. Also, the location of available courses often
requires additional time for workers to travel to a metropolitan area to receive training.
These obstacles are easier for large companies to overcome, but as will be discussed in
more detail later, the majority of accidents occur on the jobs of very small companies.
The greatest potential for reducing the frequency rates of cave-ins exists in convincing
the owners and workers of small companies to learn about cave-in hazards and to
implement methods of preventing them.
14

CHAPTERS
THE OSHA ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM

OSHA 's Integrated Management Information System
The OSHA Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) was
implemented in 1984 to establish a national data base for accident investigations. This
data base receives information from both federal and state OSHA investigations and
compiles comprehensive information on each accident. An example of a typical IMIS
report is provided in Figure 5-1.
The company's name is provided, and is followed by the address, city, and
state where the accident occurred. The standard industrial classification (SIC), and
union affiliation of the company are also listed. The dates of the accident and the
investigation starting and closing dates are provided.
A list of OSHA standards cited for violations is given with a classification for
each violation as either "willful", "serious", "repeat", "unclassified", or "other." Each
violation is also assigned a gravity rating from 1 to 10, representing respectively from
lowest to highest the severity of the violation. The classification and gravity rating are
used as some of the determinants in setting the amount of penalties. Initial penalties,
and if reduced, the current penalties are listed for each violation.
Each report includes a narrative of the accident with details of the activities
underway at the time of the accident and the physical conditions of the site. For
excavation accidents, the narrative typically provides information on the dimensions
and geometry of the excavation, the type of protective systems being used, other
conditions contributing to the cave-in, a discussion of what caused the failure, and
how the victim was injured or killed.
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Finally, details are given for the victim(s) including their age, sex, nature of
their injuries, and whether the accident resulted in fatal or nonfatal injuries. Notations
of other human or environmental factors that contributed to the accident are also listed.

IMIS Data Base
A primary source for this study was the IMIS computerized data base ( 16)
obtained from OSHA' s Office of Management Data Systems.

The data base

represents a compilation of all accident reports from January 1, 1985, through
December 31, 1994, that contained citations for any of the three excavation standards
1926.650, 1926.651, or 1926.652.

Some reports covered accidents other than cave-

ins, but appeared in the data base because the company received one or more
excavation citations in addition to those directly related to the accident being
investigated. Those reports were excluded from the data utilized in this study which
concentrated on excavation cave-ins. There were also some incomplete reports in the
data base that were excluded from this study as it could not be determined if those
reports were for cave-in accidents.

It should be noted that the IMIS data base does not cover every cave-in as it is
known that many accidents are not reported, with some estimates projecting as high as
fifty percent unreported.

Also, sometimes reports are improperly coded under

categories such as "caught in, under, or between" and thus are not included in the
excavation accident data base. Also, OSHA does not attempt to investigate all cave-in
accidents.

There are approximately 2100 inspectors covering the U. S. and its

territories which is not enough to inspect every accident, so guidelines are set on
whether an investigation is mandatory or optional for a given accident. For example,
Tennessee requires an accident investigation if there is a fatality or at least three
victims requiring hospitalization.
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CHAPTER6
EVALUATION OF CAVE-IN ACCIDENT DATA

A total of 540 complete reports were found in the IMIS which provided the
data base for this study. These reports provided information on 414 fatalities and 273
injuries over the ten-year period from 1985 through 1994. This data base made it
feasible to detect trends on cave-in accidents based on various selected criteria for the
ten-year period, which included the five years before, and five after, the 1990 revisions
to the excavation regulations. Foremost, the data indicated a positive change since
1990 with fatalities down from the prior five years as indicated in Figure 6-1. There
was an annual average of fifty-four fatalities during 1985-1989, and the annual average
decreased to twenty-eight during the 1990-1994 period. In comparison, a review of the
OSHA database for 1984 through 1986 by Suruda, et al, (9) reported 192 fatalities, or
an annual average of sixty-four. A similar review of the OSHA data base for a threeyear period in the mid-70's by Thompson and Tanenbaum (11) reported an annual
average of ninety-nine fatalities. The 1985-I 994 IMIS data base was also reviewed
relative to various selected criteria to identify factors that may have influenced cave-in
incidence rates. These criteria are identified and discussed in the following sections.

Trench Depth
Trench depths were provided in 84% of the accident reports in the IMIS data
base for the ten year period from 1985 through I 994.

The reported depths ranged

from forty feet to a minimum of 2.5 feet. The mean depth was 10.7 feet for the tenyear period with very little variation from year to year. This was fairly consistent with
mean depth of 1 I .4 feet as reported by Suruda, et al, (9) in a study of OSHA cave-in
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fatalities from 1974 to 1986. Thompson and Tanenbaum reported that 87% of cave-ins
were in trenches less than twenty feet deep, the depth at which an engineered
protection system is required. The 1985-1994 data contained 96% in that depth range.

It was notable in the 1985-1994 data that relatively shallow trenches can be
fatal. There were twenty-one fatalities in trenches that were five feet or less in depth,
representing 5% of the total 414 fatalities. Fourteen of these fatalities were in trenches
of two and one-half to five feet deep and were a result of the excavation wall failing
under the load of an adjacent masonry wall or foundation that fell into the trench. The
other seven of the twenty-one fatalities were in trenches five feet deep that failed under
their own weight and then buried or crushed the worker. The Suruda study found that
2% of deaths occurred in excavations under five feet deep. This percentage change in
the later data is possibly because the hazards in the deeper excavations are more
readily recognized due to publicity and training. Also, under the penalty structure,
penalties may be less severe in shallow excavations. This could be a reason for some
contractors to take chances in shallow, but still dangerous, excavations which would
account for the increased percentage of accidents in them. Cave-ins in trenches deeper
than five feet were nearly always a result of the excavation wall or slope failing under
its own weight because it was not properly shored or sloped.

Protective Systems
Most of the accident reports in the 1985-1994 data base identified the causes
for the cave-ins. Essentially all of the accidents were caused by failure due to the lack
of, or improper use of, a protective system.

Only thirty-eight of the accident reports

indicated some method of sloping was employed, and they were almost always noted
as being too steep, or the description of the physical dimensions of the excavation
20

made it clear that they were out of compliance.

Shoring was noted as being used in

only eight of the reports and usually it was stated that it was improperly built or the
workers were injured while attempting to install or remove it. There were no cases
where the investigation indicated that a slope or shoring which had been constructed in
apparent compliance with the regulations had failed. As one would expect, the Suruda
study and the Thompson and Tanenbaum study also found lack of adequate protective
systems as being the predominant cause of cave-ins.
Trench boxes were noted as having been used in twenty-four of the reports in
the 1985-1994 period.

However, there was almost always evidence noted of the

misuse of the box. Most often, workers were injured or killed by working outside the
trench box and placing themselves in the path of a cave-in. A couple of cases resulted
from an excavation wall or slope falling in over the top of a trench box that was not of
adequate height.

One case resulted from the end wall of a trench caving in and

engulfing workers through the open end of the trench box. Two other cave-in reports
noted that a trench box was at the site, but was not being used in the trench.

Standards Most Frequently Cited
All of the violations cited in each accident were listed in the investigative
report by subsection and paragraph corresponding to the specific standard violated. An
evaluation of all citations for each standard was performed for this study and then
reviewed to determine which standards were most frequently violated and if there were
differences in the frequencies or types of violations before and after the 1990 revisions
to the regulations. The 1990 revisions completely changed the organization of the
excavation standards so that the subsection and paragraph numbers no longer
corresponded. Thus, to review and compare the types of violations occurring in the
21

five year periods before and after 1990, one must look at the description of the
violation and not compare the identification numbers. Table 6-1 summarizes the most
frequent violations for each of the five year periods studied.
The analysis showed that the most cited violation consistently throughout the
ten year period was for lack of protective systems in excavations greater than five feet
deep, representing 24% of the violations for 1985-1989, and 26% for 1990-1994. The
regulations permit sloping, shoring, or trench boxes, but they all have disadvantages
that discourage contractors from using them.

Sloping requires substantially more

excavation time, and often restrictions such as adjacent roads or property lines make
sloping impractical. Shoring is very labor intensive to install and remove and greatly
impedes accessibility to work in the excavation due to the horizontal braces passing
through the work area.

Trench boxes are usually the fastest means to provide

protection, but they also impede work due to the horizontal braces or jacks spanning
the work area.

Boxes are also either expensive to maintain enough of them to

simultaneously protect a length of trench or else too laborious to move one box, often
back and forth, to follow the various stages of work. Some contractors continued to
risk their Ii ves and those of their workers by trying to save the time and expense
required for adequate cave-in protection.
The next most cited violation in the 1990-1994 period was the requirement for
daily inspections by a competent person. It accounted for 21 % of the violations for the
period, but only for 6% of the citations in the 1985-1989 period. The increase in
citings for lack of daily inspections likely reflected enforcement of the emphasis in the
revised standard on the responsibilities of the competent person and the importance of
his (her) control over the excavation activities.
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652(h)
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650(i)
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Part of 652(b),(c)

NA*

651G)(2)

65 l(c)(2)

652(a ),(b),(c)

24

21

3

NA*

11

12

* Personal protective equipment (PPE) requirements not included in 1990 revisions. PPE covered in Subpart E of regulations.

18.

7

652(e)

Support previously disburbed soil or for vibrations

Other violations (45 others cited)

7

Wear personal protective equipment (hard hats, etc.) 650(e)

Place spoils at least 2' back from edge of excavation

34

652(b), 652(c)

29

1990-1994

1990-1994

1985-1989
1985-1989

% of Citations

CFR Sect. Cited % of Citations CFR Sect. Cited

Provide protective system for excavations >5' deep

Standard Violated

Table 6-1. CFR Sections Most Frequently Cited in Cave-in Accidents

Industcy Type
Figure 6-2 summarizes the specific industries most often responsible for cavein accidents, and the results were not surprising. By tabulating the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) listings from the accident reports, the water, sewer, and pipeline
contractors (SIC 1623) were identified as most often involved, representing 58% of all
cave-ins during 1985-1989, and 43% during 1990-1994.

This did not appear

abnormally high considering that the majority of the linear feet of trenching work was
probably done by small pipeline contractors. Similar results were reported by Suruda
indicating that 60% of all trenching citations from 1973 to 1986 involved sewer and
pipeline firms.

Thompson and Tanenbaum also reported that a majority of the

accidents reviewed in their study involved sewer firms.
Following in second place for the 1985-1989 and 1990-1994 periods were
plumbing contractors (SIC 1711) at 11% and 16%, respectively. The excavation and
foundation contractors group (SIC 1794) was third at 11 % and 9%, respectively for the
same periods.
Federal and local government work crews were responsible for only 3% and
4% of the accidents in the two periods, respectively. The balance of accidents were
accountable to smaller numbers of occurrences among the twenty-three other SIC
construction classifications.

Company Size
Small companies of less than ten employees were responsible for the majority
of all cave-ins in the 1985-1989 period, when they accounted for 251 accidents,
representing 72% of the total for the period. For 1990-1994, they were involved in 140
accidents, which was less in absolute terms, but still accounted for 73% of the total.
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Suruda investigated this for the three years 1984 to 1986 and found 36% of
deaths in excavations were attributable to firms of less than eleven employees. An
I

explanation for the increase in recent years may simply be that a larger percentage of
excavation work was now being done by the smaller firms. Also, it may be because
these smaller firms were the least able financially to obtain training, and to buy and
install protective systems. Figure 6-3 compares the frequency of accidents by various
company sizes for the two time periods.

Union vs. Nonunion
This study found that for cave-in accidents, the jobs classified as union had a
proportionately lower rate of accidents than nonunion. The national union work force
accounted for an average of 21 % of the total work force throughout 1985-1994, but
accounted for an average of only 14% of cave-in accidents. Figure 6-4 shows the
comparison of percentage of union and nonunion related cave-in accidents for each of
the ten years. It is recognized that this proportionately lower union rate may be due to
the fact that most cave-ins occurred on jobs run by very small companies, and a greater
percentage of them were likely to be nonunion if compared to the national work force.
The performance of union versus nonunion contractors in excavation safety has
been a controversial issue. A 1990 OSHA report by Culver, et al (2), on the data base
of fatalities in all industries from 1985 through 1989 showed that the national union
work force accounted for about 22% of the work force throughout the period but, on
average, about 28% of the annual fatalities. Another report by Krizan and Bradford (6)
for the period of 1985 through 1993, showed similar results with the national union
work force representing about 21 % of all workers, but accounting for 27% of all
fatalities.
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In fairness to the unions, it should be noted that the OSHA system seemed to
bias the accountability for accidents toward unions. If any one worker at an accident
site was a union worker, then the accident was recorded in the investigative report as a
union job. Also, the unions argued that independent contractors' accidents are less
likely to show up on OSHA records and that it would be more accurate to compare
fatality rates to man-hours worked rather than to size of work force.
Regardless of the controversies, it was encouraging to note that the total
number of cave-in accidents had declined by about 50% for both union and nonunion
jobs. The number of cave-in accidents on union-designated jobs dropped from an
average of almost ten per year during 1985-1989 to less than five per year during
1990-1994. For nonunion jobs in the same periods, it dropped from sixty to thirtythree per year.

Region
OSHA, like other federal agencies, is organized into ten geographical regions
designated by Roman numerals I through X. Table 6-2 provides a list of the states and
territories comprising each OSHA region.
This study reviewed the accident data for each region, comparing the number
of fatalities for the two time periods 1985-1989 and 1990-1994 as shown in Figure 6-5.
Region IV, a large region that accounted for a large volume of construction work, led
the regions in 1985-1989 with seventy fatalities, or 26% of the total 272 fatalities
reported.

Region IV also reported the most during 1990-1994 with thirty-nine

fatalities, or 27% of the total 142 fatalities. As might be expected, Region X covering
the less densely populated areas of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington had the
fewest fatalities.
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* Indicates states/territories operating approved plans; CT and NY cover public employees only.

AK*, ID, OR*, WA*

X

AR, LA, NM*, OK, TX

VI

American Samoa, AZ*, CA*, Guam, HI*, NV*, Pacific Trust Territories

IL, IN*, MI*, MN*, OH, WI

V

IX

AL, FL, GA, KY*, MS, NC*, SC*, TN*

IV

CO, MT, ND, SD, UT*, WY*

DC, DE, MD*, PA, VA*, WV

III

VIII

NJ, NY*, PR, VI*

II

IA*, KS, MO, NE

CT*, MA, ME, NH, RI,VT*

I

VII

States and Territories

Region

Table 6-2. States and Territories in OSHA Regions
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The amount of excavation work performed in each region will affect the
number of fatalities incurred, and must be considered when comparing fatality rates of
the regions. For example, Region IV reported the most fatalities, but it also accounted
for a much larger volume of construction work than the other regions. To compensate
for the variations, an assumption was made that the volume of excavation work in each
region is proportional to the total construction work force employed in the region.
Then to normalize the data, each region's number of fatalities was divided by the
average work force employed in the region during the two time periods considered.
Figure 6-6 depicts the normalized results for each region and shows that Regions VII
and VIII incurred the highest rates of fatalities with approximately 9.9 and 8.4 cave-in
fatalities, respectively, per 100,000 construction workers in 1985-1989 and 7.3 and 4.3,
respectively, in 1990-1994.

Region IV was in third place in the normalized

evaluation, after accounting for it having the largest average annual construction work
force among the regions (999,000 workers during 1985-1989, and 942,000 workers
during 1990-1994). Region X results showed it to have the lowest fatality rate among
the regions, and it also had the smallest average construction work force (156,000
workers during 1985-1989 and 207,000 workers during 1990-1994).

It is encouraging that Figures 6-5 and 6-6 both depict a positive trend in all
areas, except Region X, with the fatality rates being consistently down, in most cases
by approximately 50%. Region X increased from no fatalities during 1985-1989 to
having two fatalities during 1990-1994, thus causing its rate to increase significantly,
although the absolute number of fatalities was very small.
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Penalties
One very notable trend in the data was the increase in penalties, particularly in
comparing the 1990-1994 period to the prior five-year period. The average penalty in
the 1985-1989 period was $2,723 but for the 1990-1994 period it jumped to $12,390.
The range of penalties during 1985-1989 was from none up to $62,000 and for 19901994 the range was from none up to $497,000 (an initial penalty for a case that was
still open and likely to be reduced as discussed below).
Congress passed a law effective in November, 1990, that set new minimum
mandatory penalties for willful violations, and increased the maximum limits of fines
seven-fold (17). The penalty assessment process remained as it had been, weighing
factors such as the gravity, or seriousness, of an accident along with the size, good
faith efforts, and history of the company to apply graded reductions to the maximum
initial penalty for a given accident.

Small companies with up to twenty-five

employees qualified for 60% reductions, while companies larger than 250 employees
received no reduction due to company size. Companies judged to have made good
faith efforts to provide a safe workplace received up to an additional 25% reduction,
and without any repeat violations in the past three years, an additional I 0%. Thus it
was possible for a small company to pay only 5% of the maximum penalties. The
IMIS data base contained examples of cases where all penalties were waived, as were
almost always the case for local, state, or federal government agency accidents.
This new law increased the maximum penalty for each willful or repeat
violation to $70,000. The IMIS data base contained an average of six violations cited
per accident during 1990-1994, so the new penalty system sometimes resulted in huge
fines. There were eight accidents that were fined in excess of $100,000 each between
1991 and 1994. The largest one assessed, and not yet closed, was against an Oregon
34

company for $497,600 for a fatal accident in December, 1994, with three serious and
seven willful violations. The company was listed as having only two employees with
no repeat violations indicated, so the fine was likely to be reduced at least 70% based
on the graded penalty system. Still, 30% of the initial penalty is over $149,000 which
is a huge fine for most two-person companies. Six of these eight cases were still open
and under protest from the companies, so final penalties were likely to be reduced.
The largest fine listed in the data base as having been paid was for $115,000 in 1992
against a Kansas company of thirty employees for a fatality and a nonfatal injury.
A chart showing the history of average penalties per accident for the ten-year
period is shown in Figure 6-7. To prevent the huge penalties in the contested, and still
open, cases mentioned above from skewing the data, this study reviewed each one and
factored in the reductions from the initial penalty for company size and absence of
repeat violations that are all but certain to be applied. It is believed that this approach
resulted in a more accurate estimate of the most likely final penalties for comparison to
previous years.
Several factors may have concurrently influenced the downward trend in cavein fatalities, and certainly increasing penalties contributed.

A curve showing the

declining numbers of cave-in fatalities is also included in Figure 6.7. The fatality rate
for this chart was normalized by determining the frequency of cave-in fatalities per
million construction workers in the national work force for each year. The national
construction work force was obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics.

It

fluctuated from approximately four and one-half to five million workers per year
during the ten-year period studied. The comparison of the increasing penalties and the
corresponding decrease in fatality rates indicated a correlation between the two.
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Other Factors
The sex of accident victims was noted in all of the 540 reports studied. All of
the victims were male.

The excavation industry historically has been comprised

almost entirely of male workers, so this finding was not surprising.
Age was another factor noted in the data base. The average age for excavation
workers was thirty-four years old, approximately the same as the construction industry
in general. This was approximately the same as the Suruda report which found the
average age to be thirty-five years old. The range of ages of victims was from fifteen
to sixty-eight years.
One finding of concern was the number of accidents in which the victims were
very young. There were five separate accidents in Arizona and Texas in 1985 whose
victims were only sixteen years old, three of them were fatalities of young men with
Hispanic names. Two more sixteen year olds were killed in Iowa in cave-ins in 1988
and 1991. Also in 1991, cave-ins injured a fifteen year old boy in Virginia and a
sixteen year old in Utah. According to the accident reports, all of these young victims
were hired workers, except the fifteen year old who went into a trench to talk to his
older cousin who was employed by the trenching contractor. Hopefully, the absence of
any young victims in the 1992-1994 data was an indication that contractors were
refraining from working young people in excavations, or at least they were adequately
training and protecting them.
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CHAPTER7
CONCLUSION

Evaluation of the IMIS data base for cave-in accidents from 1985 through
1994 indicated that there had been a notable decrease in cave-in accident and fatality
rates subsequent to the 1990 revisions to the OSHA excavation regulations. The
corresponding, and substantial, increase in penalties for citations assessed to
contractors since 1990 appeared to have influenced this trend.

The increased

requirements for qualifying competent persons, and more emphasis on training of
excavation workers, likely influenced the trend also. These results indicated the
importance of two key people in excavation firms who are in positions to most
influence reduction of cave-in accidents. The company owner or supervisor must
ensure that resources are provided for protective systems, and the competent person
must accept the responsibility, as required in the revised standards, to ensure that an
excavation is safe.
Although the overall frequency rate of cave-ins decreased after the 1990
revisions, the firms most often responsible for accidents remained consistent with
data from the prior five years. Very small firms, usually water and sewer pipeline
companies of less than ten employees were most often responsible. Concentrating on
training and enforcement of the excavation standards in this area of the construction
industry offers the most potential for further reducing cave-in accident rates. A
significant impediment to improvements among small companies is thought to be
the expense of providing training and cave-in protection systems.
As found in past studies, the cave-ins that occurred were almost always a
result of not using any protective system in the excavation. The majority of the
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accidents continued to be in relatively shallow trenches. Usually, the walls of the
excavations were at, or near, vertical and often the earth spoil was piled at the edge
of the excavation. There were almost always other contributing factors such as
water saturated ground, or vibrations from adjacent traffic and equipment.
Evaluation of the data relative to union membership, geographical location of
accidents, and age or sex of workers did not indicate any findings that were
significantly inconsistent with the size of work forces associated with these factors.
In conclusion, this study indicated that the revisions to the 1990 excavation
regulations resulted in decreased cave-in accident rates. Accidents still continue to
occur, so continued emphasis on education and training, coupled with appropriate
penalties for violations, will likely be the most effective means to further reduce the
number of cave-ins.
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